

THE
MEMORIAL
OF
His Prussian Majesty,
EXHIBITING
The CONDUCT of the Courts of
VIENNA and DRESDEN.

To which is annexed,

The ORIGINAL PAPERS, found in the
Cabinet of the King of Poland.



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Argumentative Memorial

Relative to the CONDUCT of the

Courts of Vienna and Dresden, and
their dangerous Designs against his
Majesty the King of Prussia.

W I T H

THE ORIGINAL PAPERS and VOUCHERS
In Proof of the same.

TH E reasons which have laid the king under the necessity of taking up arms against the court of Vienna, and making sure, during this war, of the hereditary dominions of the king of Poland, are grounded on the most exact rules of equity and justice. It is not from motives of ambition, nor from views of aggrandisement, 'tis from a series of projects, plots, and treacheries, on the part of these two courts, that his majesty has been compelled to attend to his own defence and security. The discoveries which he has made relative to this important object, set this truth in its full light, and prove, to a sort of demonstration, the justice of his cause,
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and the badness of the proceedings of those, who have forced him to these shocking extremities.

Although the intimations which his majesty received of the intrigues that were carrying on secretly to his prejudice, were of a long standing, yet he could have wished to have it in his power, to suffer them to remain buried in those scenes of darkness whence they took their origin; but being put out of all patience, by the approaching execution of the vast projects of the court of Vienna, and the obstinacy of this court, in refusing to hearken to all ways of conciliation, his majesty is obliged with reluctance to lay before the public, the proofs which he is in possession of, concerning the ill intentions and dangerous designs of the courts of Vienna and Dresden against him. These proofs will serve to ascertain the necessity and justice of the measures which his majesty has taken, and to shew that there has nothing been promised the public, which cannot be verified from authentic papers, which his majesty had long since notice of, but of which he thought it incumbent on him afterwards to procure himself the originals of, in order thereby to disable his enemies from denying the existence and truth thereof.

In order to get at the source of that most extensive plan, which has been the subject of the joint endeavours of the courts of Vienna and Saxony ever since the peace of Dresden, it will be necessary to recur back to the war which preceded that peace. The flattering hopes which the two allied courts had conceived from the success of the campaign of 1744, gave occasion to a treaty of eventual partition, which they concluded

cluded May 18, 1745. By virtue of this treaty, the court of Vienna was to have the dutchy of Silesia and the county of Glatz ; and the king of Poland, elector of Saxony the dutchies of Magd-
burgh and Crossen, the circles of Züllichaw and of Swibus, with that Part of Lusatia belonging to Prussia ; or only a part of these provinces, proportionably to the conquests that should be made *.

After the peace of Dresden, which was signed December 25, 1745, and by which the king gave signal proofs of his love of peace, his disinterestedness, and his moderation, a treaty of so extraordinary a nature, as that of an eventual partition, ought no longer to take place with regard to a power, with which the two contracting parties lived in peace : notwithstanding this, the court of Vienna made no scruple to propose to the court of Saxony, perhaps some days after the signing that treaty of peace, the entering into a new treaty of alliance, in which a renewal likewise of the partition of the 28th of May 1745 was to take place, as may be proved from the very project which was then delivered in at Dresden.

The court of Saxony, in order to the better consolidating its system, concluded first of all on the advantage of building it on the foundation of an alliance between the courts of Russia and Vienna. These powers actually concluded May 22, 1746, at Petersburg, a defensive alliance, if we may judge of it from the instrument of the treaty which has been made public ; but it is not a matter of any difficulty to perceive, that the ostensible body of this treaty, was made up solely with a view to conceal from the public the six secret

* Number I.

articles, of which the fourth is solely aimed at Prussia, agreeable to the exact copy thereof, which is to be met with among the original Papers †.

In this article, the empress-queen of Hungary and Bohemia, sets out with protestations that she will pay a religious observance to the treaty of Dresden ; but very soon after she explains her true sentiments with regard to this affair, where she thus goes on, “ Should the King of Prussia
“ be the first to recede from this peace, by mak-
“ ing a hostile attack, either on her majesty the
“ empress-queen of Hungary and Bohemia, or
“ her majesty the empress of Russia, or the re-
“ public of Poland (in all which cases, the rights
“ of her majesty the empress-queen on Silesia
“ and the county of Glatz would again take
“ place, and resume their entire full effect) the
“ contracting parties will mutually assist each
“ other with a body each of sixty thousand men,
“ in order to re-conquer Silesia, &c.

Such are the titles on which the court of Vienna proposes to ground her claim to Silesia. Every war which may chance to break out between the king and Russia, or between the king and the republic of Poland, must be considered as a breach of the peace of Dresden, and revive the rights of Austria to Silesia : and this, although neither Russia nor the republic of Poland have been in any ways parties in the peace of Dresden ; and though the latter, with which the king has moreover the satisfaction to live in the closest friendship, be not even an ally of the court of Vienna. If we have recourse to the principles of the law of nature allowed among all civilized nations, they will tell us, that in such

† Number II.

cases it would be at most warrantable in the court of Vienna, to lend such assistance to its allies, as it owes them by virtue of alliances, without its being allowable to it to form any pretensions, so as to be free from the particular engagements which subsist between it and the king. It is therefore submitted to the impartial public, whether in the fourth secret article of the treaty of Petersburgh, the contracting powers have kept within the bounds of a defensive alliance, or whether it does not rather discover a formal plan of an offensive alliance, which aims at stripping the king of Silesia.

It is easily discoverable, that the court of Vienna has, by this article, prepared itself three pretences for the retaking Silesia ; and if we compare these with her conduct since that till the present time, 'tis evident she expected to succeed in her aim, by exhausting the king's patience so as to force him to a commencement of hostilities, or by her machinations and secret intrigues, to blow up the coals between his majesty and Russia or Poland.

'Tis not to be wondered at that the treaty of Petersburgh should have been the hinge on which has hung Austrian policy since the peace of Dresden till this present time, and that the principal negociations of the court of Vienna should have been directed to the strengthening this alliance by the accession of other powers.

The court of Saxony was the first invited to this accession in the beginning of the year 1747 ; this court fell into the scheme at once, and with some eagerness : to this purpose the Saxon ministers at Petersburgh, count Vitzdom and sieur Pezold, were provided with full powers, and

they were directed to declare the court of Saxony's readiness to accede, not only to the treaty itself, but also to the secret article against Prussia; and to concur in the arrangements that were made by the two courts: provided better measures were taken than heretofore, as well for its safety and defence, as to have an indemnification and reward proportionable to its efforts, and the progress that should be made. With respect to the last part, it was declared by the order of the court of Saxony, that if the empress-queen, again attacked by the king of Prussia, did succeed, with its assistance, in new-conquering not only Silesia and the county of Glatz, but also in screwing him into a narrower compass, the king of Poland as elector of Saxony would be satisfied with the partition stipulated between his Polish majesty and the empress-queen in the convention signed at Leipfick, May 18, 1745. Count Lofs, the then Saxon minister at Vienna, received orders at the same time to enter upon a particular negotiation for settling the eventual partition of the conquests which were to take place on Prussia, and make the treaty of partition concluded at Leipfick May 18, 1745, the ground work. The particulars of all this will be seen among the vouchers in the instruction given May 23, 1747, to the Saxon ministers at Petersburg *, in the memorial delivered by these ministers in consequence to the Russian ministry Sept. 25, 1747 †, and in the instruction given to count Lofs at Vienna Dec. 21, 1747 ¶. 'Tis therefore plain, beyond contradiction, from all these authentick writings, that the court of Saxony has given evidences of

* Vouchers, N^o. III. † Ib. N^o. IV. ¶ Ib. N^o. V.

its readiness to enter into all the offensive connections of the treaty of Petersburgh; that it is this court has since the peace given occasion to the revival of the partition treaty concluded to the king's prejudice during the last war; and that by this conduct it has warranted the king in turning his resentment of this treaty against that court, notwithstanding the amnesty agreed on by the treaty of Dresden.

'Tis true there runs through all this negociation an affectation of supposing the king would be the aggressor against the court of Vienna; but what right can result from that to the king of Poland to make conquests on the king? or if his Polish Majesty as an auxiliary party be willing to become a principal in the war, ought any body wonder his majesty should deal with him as such, and regulate his conduct on that of the court of Saxony? 'Tis a truth acknowledged by the king of Poland's own privy council, when called upon to give its opinion of the accession to the treaty of Petersburgh; witness the two extracts which are found among the original papers ¶, where the said privy council gives his Polish majesty to understand, That the principle laid down in the fourth secret article of the treaty of Petersburgh exceeded the rules commonly observed; and that, should his Polish majesty grant his approbation to it by his accession, his Prussian majesty might consider it in the light of a violation of the peace of Dresden.

Count Bruhl himself, undoubtedly from an inward conviction of this truth, endeavoured to the utmost of his power, to conceal the existence of the secret articles of the treaty of Petersburgh;

¶ Vouchers, N^o. VI. VII.

for at the time that he was so active in prosecuting the negotiation at Vienna, with respect to the accession of his court to the treaty of Petersburgh, and to the secret articles of the said treaty, he caused a solemn declaration to be made at Paris, " That the treaty of Petersburgh, " to which his Polish majesty was desired to accede, contained nothing but what appeared in " the German copy which had been communicated to the court of France; and that no secret " and separate article had been communicated to " the king of Poland; and that should such a separate and secret article exist, his Polish majesty " would enter into no engagement that might " have any tendency to give offence to his most " christian majesty:" as appears from count Bruhl's letter to count Lofs, written the 18th of June, and the memorial delivered in consequence to the ministry of Versailles by count Lofs†.

'Tis also true the court of Saxony still postponed from time to time acceding formally to the treaty of Petersburgh; but on the other hand it was not deficient in its declarations on a thousand occasions to its allies, of its readiness to accede thereto without restriction, whenever it could do it without running too evident a risque, and after the share which it was to have in the advantages which might be obtained should be ascertained.

This principle is expressed in clear terms in the instruction given the 19th of February to general Arnim, who was then going as minister from Saxony to Petersburgh§; and an hundred dispatches, were it necessary, might be produced as an evidence, that the Saxon ministers have always explained themselves in the same sense.

† Vouchers, N^o. VIII, IX. § Ib. N^o. X.

The court of Saxony, upon a fresh invitation to accede to the treaty of Petersburgh, declared its good will towards it; in a memorial delivered to the Russian minister at Dresden †; and the Saxon minister at Petersburgh, the sieur Funck, had full powers and other necessary instruments; but it was insisted at the same time that the king of England, as elector of Hanover, should previously accede to the secret articles of the treaty of Petersburgh: and as his Britannick majesty would never agree to share in this mystery of iniquity, count Bruhl found himself under a necessity of waiting the issue of a project, that had been formed of making another very innocent alliance, in order to effectuate his designs; as appears from a letter from count Bruhl to the sieur Funck, May 2, 1753, which unravels this affair:

The courts of Vienna and Saxony chose to appear in these trappings of moderation, that they might not offend too much the nice consciences of those of their allies, who shewed their abhorrence of the secret views of the alliance of Petersburgh; but, among each other, they never lost sight of their favourite plan of previously dividing the spoils of the king of Prussia, in always making the fourth secret article of the said treaty the groundwork thereof: this appears plain enough from a letter of count Flemming, Feb. 28, 1753 ||, wherein he acquaints count Bruhl,

That count Uhlefeld had charged him to represent a second time to his court, that the ambitious views of the king of Prussia could not be sufficiently cautioned against; and that above all the rest, Saxony, as being the most exposed, could never be too much on its guard against

† Vouchers, N^o. XI. || Ibid. N^o. XII.

him ; that it was therefore of great consequence to reinforce their old engagements, on the footing proposed by count Harrach in 1745 ; and this might be effected on the occasion of the accession to the treaty of Petersburg.

Count Bruhl's answer to this dispatch, March 8, 1753, § was,

That his Polish majesty was not averse from coming to an agreement hereafter with the court of Vienna, and in the utmost secrecy, concerning an assistance ; by means of private declarations, and such as should be made in confidence, relative to the fourth secret article of the treaty of Petersburg ; with a proviso of certain equitable conditions and advantages, which ought in this case to be granted him in return. He adds, I am previously of opinion, that what was promised by the empress-queen's declaration of May 3, 1745, may serve for a basis *.

In short, to conclude with setting forth in its full light the system of the court of Saxony, in regard to this accession, we need only recite the very expressions contained in a dispatch of count Flemming to count Bruhl, dated June 16, 1756, in which the former expresses his sentiments very naturally in this manner :

Your excellency is acquainted with the great difficulties which we met with from the court of Vienna, when in the last war we claimed the case of the alliance ; and the answer its ministry gave us, which was still fresh in your excellency's memory, when instances were made us to accede to the treaty of Petersburg of 1746 ; and that we shewed our readiness to do it, provided we

* Vouchers, N^o. XIII.

§ This is the treaty of partition, the Vienna copy being dated May 3, and that of Dresden May 18, 1745.

were

were not brought on the scene, but subsequently to an attack on the king of Prussia, and to a division of his forces, that we might not be in danger, from the situation of our country, of becoming the first victims.

The allies of Saxony entered at last into this plan of the court of Dresden; witness, among other proofs, an extraordinary passage contained in the dispatch of the sieur Funck, June 7, 1753, where he writes word.

That, having been asked at Petersburg whether his court would not also lift up the buckler† in case of a war with Prussia; and having replied, that the situation of Saxony did not allow it to enter the lists till her powerful neighbour was disabled, it was answered him, That he was in the right; and that the Saxons ought to wait till the champion was dismounted.

Is it not therefore evident, from all the proofs that have been alledged, that the court of Saxony, though it had not acceded formally to the treaty of Petersburg, is not the less an accomplice in all the dangerous designs which the court of Vienna has built upon the foundation of this treaty; and that being by its allies dispensed with a formal concurrence, it waited only for the moment wherein it might, without exposing itself too much, concur in it effectually, and share in its neighbours spoils.

In the interim the Austrian and Saxon ministers laboured only more zealously, in concert, and in a clandestine manner, to pave the way for those means which might give an existence to the case of the secret alliance of Petersburg. In this treaty it was laid down as a principle, that by whatever war broke out between the king

† Take Arms,

and Russia, the empress-queen should be authorised to the retakeing Silesia, all that was then to be done was to bring such a war about: no method was found more adequate to the compassing this end, than to set the king at variance with her majesty the empress of Russia beyond a possibility of reconciliation; and to make use of the most odious impostures and calumnies to incense that princess, by laying to the king's charge all sorts of designs, sometimes against Russia, and even the person of the empress, at other times, on Poland, and even relatively to Sweden. The publick will judge of the truth of what has been just advanced from the following sketches:

By a dispatch of count Vitzdom's, the Saxon minister at St. Petersburg, dated April 18th 1747 *, it will appear,

That baron Bretlack, minister of Vienna, exults in having found a way, by means of communications made in confidence, on the part of his court, concerning several clandestine practices of the king of Prussia, to the disadvantage of her imperial majesty, to inspire her with sentiments which wrought up her enmity to the last degree; and that the two ministers of Vienna and Saxony were concerting with each other, how to accommodate matters between the empress-queen and France, that the first might be able to make head against the king of Prussia.

By a dispatch, of the 6th July, 1747, count Bernes acquaints the empress-queen with the argument he used in order to excite the Russian minister count Keyserling, to render his reports more spirited, and to exaggerate the military arrangements of the king of Prussia.

* Vouchers, N^o. XIV,

The sieur de Weingarten, secretary to the Austrian embassy at the court of Berlin, writes count Uhlefeld word, the 24th August 1748; that, at the requisition of count Bernes, then residing at Petersburgh, he had prevailed on the Russian minister at Berlin, to write his court word, that the king of Prussia was making new preparations of war, which had no other tendency than to procure the sovereignty to the prince successor of Sweden *.

The 12th December 1749, count Bernes wrote from Petersburgh to count la Puebla at Berlin, that he ought to take care to have insinuated to the Russian minister the sieur Gros, that something was hatching in Sweden against the life and the person of the empress of Russia, in which the court of Prussia had no small share; and that when the sieur Gros should tell it him in confidence, he was to confirm the truth of this discovery †.

The Saxon ministers have acquitted themselves in this business with as much dexterity as those of Vienna; and indeed, it may be even said they surpassed them.

In the instruction which the court of Saxony gave in 1750 to general Arnim, upon his setting out as its minister for Petersburgh, there is an express article charging him to use his skill in keeping up the diffidence and jealousy of the court of Russia against Prussia, and to encourage every disposition that should take place against that crown §.

No one of them all distinguished himself more in the execution of these orders than the sieur de

*Original papers, N^o. XV. † Vouchers, N^o. XVI.
§ Vouchers, N^o. XVII.

Funck, minister of Saxony at Petersburg, who was the life and soul of the whole party.

Never did that minister let slip an opportunity of insinuating that the king was forming designs against Courland, Polish Prussia, and the city of Dantzick; that the courts of France, Prussia, and Sweden, were hatching vast projects, in case of a vacancy of the throne of Poland, and other innumerable falsehoods of the same stamp, which have been sufficiently proved such by the conduct, full of friendship and moderation, which he has constantly observed towards the republic of Poland, and by the care he has taken not to intermeddle in the domestic affairs of Poland and Courland, notwithstanding the example given him in that respect by other powers.

It were tedious to relate all the insinuations of this nature which are scattered in the correspondences of the Saxon ministers; it will suffice to cite a remarkable passage contained in a dispatch of the sieur Funck, 6th of December 1753*.

Count Bruhl was always very exact to supply frequently the Saxon ministers with materials for such insinuations.

Thus, by the dispatches of the 6th and 13th February 1754 §, he gives advices to the ministers of Petersburg of the commercial arrangements, the erection of mints, and the armaments in Prussia. Adding this reflection, that the ambition of the king was well known, as likewise his views of aggrandisement on Polish Prussia, and his project for ruining the trade of Dantzic.

* Vouchers, N^o. XVIII. § Ibid. N^o. XIX.

By the dispatch of 18th July, 1754, he insinuates the king's having a design on Courland, because the Gazette of Berlin had pronounced Biron dead * ; and, in that of 2d August †, he pretends to make people believe that France and Prussia had been labouring a great while at the Ottoman porte to bring about a war with Russia ; and that if they succeeded, the king of Prussia would not miss that opportunity of executing his design on Courland.

In the dispatch of Dec. 1st 1754 ‡, count Bruhl causes to be conveyed to Russia the pretended intelligence, that the king of Prussia, in order to make his alliance go down with the court of Denmark, had made it a tender of its assistance to get possession of the dutchy of Holstein, on pretence of the grand duke of Russia's having embraced the Greek religion; which was not tolerated in the empire; a thing his majesty had never dreamt of, and in proof of the falshood of which he can with confidence challenge the testimony of the court of Copenhagen.

The sieur-de Funck wrote word to count Bruhl, July 9th 1755, that the sieur Gros, the Russian minister at Dresden, would do a piece of service to the common cause, if he would mention to his court, that the king of Prussia had found a canal in Courland, through which he received intimations of all the secrets of the Russian court; and that a good use was intended to be made of this advice with the empress §.

Count Bruhl answers the 23d July, that he had apprized of this the sieur Gros, who would not fail acting in consequence.

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* Vouchers, N°. XX. † Ibid. N°. XXI. ‡ Ibid. N°. XXII. § Ibid. N°. XXIII.

By the concurrent assistance of so great a number of calumnies * and impositions, they at length succeeded in surprising the religion of the empress of Russia, and prejudicing this princess to such a pitch against the King, that by a result of the assemblies of the Russian senate, held the 14th and 15th May 1753, at Petersburg, it was laid down as a fundamental maxim of that empire, to oppose all ulterior aggrandisement of the king of Prussia, and to crush him; by pouring down superior forces on him, whenever a favourable opportunity offered of reducing the house of Brandenburg back to its original state of minuteness.

This resolution was renewed in a great council held in the month of October 1755: nay it was there extended so far, that it was determined to attack the king of Prussia, without any farther discussion; whether this prince attacked any of the allies of the court of Russia, or whether he was himself attacked by any of the allies of the said court †.

To give an idea of the joy which this resolution of the court of Russia gave to count Bruhl, and how far he was disposed to unite his own therewith, the two following passages, shall be transcribed. In the dispatch of 11th Nov. 1755 he makes the sieur Funck this answer:

The deliberations of the grand council reflect the more glory on Russia, as nothing can be more advantageous to the common cause, than laying previously a foundation for effectual measures to destroy the overgrown power of Prussia, and the undoubted ambition of that court.

In the dispatch of 23d November he expresses himself thus:

The

* Vouchers, N°. XXIV. † Ibid. N°. XXV.

The result of the grand council of Russia has given us much satisfaction : the private communication which the court of Russia is pleased to make thereof will enable all its allies, as likewise our court, to enter into an explanation relative to the measures to be taken in consequence. But Saxony cannot be blamed for proceeding, considering the preponderating power of her neighbour, with the greatest circumspection ; and waiting, previous to every thing, that a provision be made for her safety by her allies, and to be assisted with the requisite means to act.

The convention for the neutrality of Germany, signed at London the 16th of January, having overturned the calumnies of count Bruhl, and unhinged his system of iniquity, he applied himself with redoubled efforts, in Russia, to prevent the re-establishment of a good understanding between the king and the court of Petersburg. Behold how he explains his sentiments on this head, in his dispatch of 23d June 1756.

The reconciliation between the courts of Berlin and Petersburg would be the most critical and dangerous event that could happen. It is to be hoped Russia will not give ear to such odious propositions ; and that the court of Vienna will find a way to defeat so fatal an union.

The court of Vienna having thoroughly succeeded in this respect ; and fancying, from the new connections which it had contracted in the course of this year, that now was the favourable moment when she might, without controul, set about retaking Silesia ; it lost no time in taking its measures in consequence. All the world knows the great armaments by sea and land which the court of Russia made in April, without any apparent end ; the court of England,

whose name was made free with on this occasion, having called for no assistance. Soon after, Bohemia and Moravia were seen crowded with troops, camps were assembled, magazines erected, and in short, every preparation was made for an approaching war.

It was not from bare suspicions, or false intelligence, that the king was induced to ascribe those armaments to a secret combination, against his territories, and afterwards postponed, for certain reasons, till next year; his majesty had such notices thereof, as approach to a demonstration. Here are some sketches.

The sieur Prasse, secretary to the Saxon embassy at Petersburg, wrote a letter to count Bruhl, April 12, 1756, conceived in these words.

“ I Have been directed to tell your excellency,
 “ that it was wished you would, in order to
 “ favour certain views, please to have conveyed
 “ by different channels to Petersburg the fol-
 “ lowing advice: That the king of Prussia, on
 “ pretence of commerce, was sending officers
 “ and engineers in disguise into the Ukrain, in
 “ order to reconnoitre the country, and to stir
 “ up the inhabitants to a rebellion: that this in-
 “ telligence was not to come from the court of
 “ Saxony, nor through the channel of the Envoy
 “ de Gros, but by a third hand, that the con-
 “ trivance may not be visible. The same
 “ commission has been given to other ministers,
 “ so as this piece of news may come from more
 “ places than one. I was also desired to write of
 “ it to the baron de Saak in Sweden, which I
 “ shall not fail complying with; and I was as-
 fured,

“ fured, that the good of our court was alfo con-
 “ cerned therein : with this addition, That the
 “ king of Pruffia had given Saxony a blow,
 “ which it would feel for fifty years ; but ~~that a~~
 “ blow was soon to be given him, which he
 “ should not recover from, thefe hundred years.”

Count Bruhl, always ready to do the king
 prejudice, and but little nice as to the choice of
 the means, promised, in his difpatch of June 2,
 to difcharge this commiffion * : behold then the
 pretence for a rupture found out at once.

Secretary Praffe writes in another difpatch
 May 10.

“ **B** EING to vifit a certain minifter, he told
 “ me, he waited with impatience the effect
 “ of the advice that had been fuggelted ; and he
 “ gave me to underftand, that a war with the
 “ king of Pruffia would not be much longer a
 “ fubject of hesitation, in order to fet bounds to
 “ the power of fo troublefome a neighbour. I
 “ took the liberty to remonstrate, that I could
 “ not fee who the ally was for whole fake fo
 “ powerful a diversion was to be made, efpecially
 “ fince the convention of neutrality that has
 “ been figned between the kings of Pruffia and
 “ England. Upon which I was answered, thefe
 “ engagements don’t at all concern us, we go on
 “ our own way, keeping clofe to the fenfe of
 “ the treaty of fubfidy : the empress having en-
 “ trusted the grand council with the care of exe-
 “ cuting this treaty, it was thought fit to take
 “ thofe meafures, which were moft confiftent with
 “ the glory of the crown, and the fafety of our
 “ allies.”

The same secretary writes, June 21.

“ **W**ERE we to judge from the present
 “ position of affairs at the court of Russia,
 “ we might conclude, that this court approves
 “ greatly of the new connexions of the court of Vi-
 “ enna with France, and that it might even extend
 “ its engagements with the court of Vienna, so
 “ as to support it in its enterprizes against
 “ Prussia, as mentioned publicly at Peterf-
 “ burgh. That count Esterhasi was very busy in
 “ negotiating, but with the greatest secrecy.
 “ He adds, his having learned from persons who
 “ were well informed, that the order to counter-
 “ mand the armaments by sea and land, pro-
 “ ceeded from the want equally of good officers and
 “ sailors for the marine, as well as of magazines
 “ and forage for the troops in the land service.”

The advices from Vienna chime perfectly with
 those from Russia. Count Flemming, minis-
 ter from Saxony at Vienna, writes to count
 Bruhl, June 12, in these very words.

“ **H**AVING conducted the thread of my dis-
 “ course with count Caunitz insensibly to
 “ the armament of Russia, I asked him the rea-
 “ son of it; and although this minister did not
 “ explain himself clearly on that occasion, yet he
 “ did not contradict me when I told him, that
 “ these grand preparations seemed rather to be
 “ intended against the king of Prussia, than to
 “ fulfil the engagements with England. I gave,
 “ on that occasion, to understand to count Can-
 “ nitz, that I could not well perceive how Rus-
 “ sia could maintain such numerous armies out
 “ of

“ of her frontiers, if the subsidies of England
 “ were to cease; that of course the empress-
 “ queen must be disposed to supply their place.
 “ Upon which he made me this answer: That
 “ money should not be regretted, provided it
 “ were well employed. These were his very
 “ words; and when I observed to him, that it
 “ was to be apprehended, should this prince, who
 “ is full of craft and penetration, discover upon
 “ this occasion, that there was an understanding
 “ with this court, he might attack it suddenly.
 “ He replied, that this did not give much
 “ uneasiness, that he would meet with his match,
 “ and that people were prepared against all
 “ events.”

In the dispatch of July 14, count Flemming
 expresses himself thus.

“ **C**OUNT Keyserling has received a letter from
 “ a certain Russian minister, which is so
 “ very enigmatical, that it is hard to form a
 “ judgment of the sentiments of his court, and
 “ the resolution which it will please to take in the
 “ present crisis. The said letter is dated June 15,
 “ and contains in substance, that he would not
 “ fail to have informed him of the connexion of
 “ the present affairs, had he not been prevented
 “ from it by the great secrecy which it was agreed
 “ should be observed, and which prescribed to
 “ him the use of a style equally laconic and
 “ mysterious; that he was not surprized he,
 “ Keyserling, should behold before his eyes a
 “ chaos which he could not clear up; however,
 “ that at present all he could do, was to refer him
 “ to the proverb *sapienti sat*, in hopes that here-
 “ after he, as well as Caunitz, might lay aside
 “ their

“ their reservedness; that the treaty of England
 “ with Prussia had caused a great alteration in
 “ the affairs; and that, as the good correspond-
 “ ence between England and Prussia went on
 “ its course, he must be on his guard with re-
 “ spect to Mr. Keith.”

Count Flemming's dispatches are full of a great number of such passages. He says, among other things; that count Keyserling had received orders to spare neither pains nor money, to get at an exact knowledge of the state of the revenues of the court of Vienna; and he assures, that the latter had remitted a million of florins to Petersburg. He himself appears very often to be persuaded of the settled combination between the two courts of Vienna and Russia; that the latter, in order the better to conceal the true reasons of its armaments, alledged the specious pretext of being enabled thereby to fulfil the engagements contracted with England. And when all the preparations should be completed, to fall suddenly on the king of Prussia*. This persuasion runs through all his dispatches; and we may refer ourselves to a minister so experienced, so well informed, and who had it so much in his power to be so.

Upon a combination of all these circumstances; the treaty of Petersburg, which authorised the court of Vienna to the retaking of Silesia; so soon as there should be a war between Prussia and Russia; the resolution solemnly entered on; in Russia, to take the first opportunity of falling on the king of Prussia, whether he was the aggressor, or whether he was attacked; the armaments of the two imperial courts, at a time when neither the one or the other had any foe to apprehend,

but

* Vouchers, N^o. XXVII.

but when the conjecture seemed to favour the views of the court of Vienna on Silesia; the formal confession of the Russian ministers, that these armaments were designed against the king; the tacit confession of count Caunitz; the eagerness of the Russian ministers to find a pretence, by accusing the king of having aimed at raising a rebellion in the Ukraïn: I say on combining all these circumstances, there results a kind of demonstration of a secret combination entered on, to his prejudice; and it is submitted to the judgment of the impartial public, whether his majesty, who had intimations of a long standing of all these particulars, could refuse all sort of credit to such positive advices, which came to him from good hands, by a consent of a similar nature; and consequently whether he had not a right to require of the court of Vienna, amicable explanations and assurances concerning the end of its armaments.

Instead of corresponding by an equal return, with this method of acting full, equally, of friendship and candor, the empress-queen thought proper to strengthen the just suspicions of the king, by an answer as tart as it was captious and obscure; in speaking thus to the sieur Klingraaf: 'That she had taken her measures for her own safety, and that of her allies and friends.'

What this pretended danger is cannot be comprehended; the empress-queen had nothing to fear for herself, especially since her new alliance with one of the most respectable powers of Europe; and there was none of her allies stood in need of her assistance. But the riddle is explained; upon collating this answer with the circumstances already alledged, especially the secret article of the alliance of Petersburg, by virtue of which the

the empress-queen fancies herself entitled to lay claim to Silesia, as often as the king should be at variance with her allies. In vain she urges, that this alliance was only defensive. The step is not very remote from defensive to offensive, when two allies furnish each other mutually with pretexts for a war, and when the auxiliary party fancies itself entitled to make conquests on the enemy of that which is at war: and besides, from the pretext which was searched for, it is plain enough in what manner they were disposed to interpret the word offensive.

In short, it is easy to make the public sensible of the true scope of this answer, from the very words of count Caunitz, mentioned in a very interesting dispatch of count Flemming's, July 28. This dispatch, which is to be found at full length among the vouchers *, sets the system of the court of Vienna in its full light. Count Flemming, after reciting in detail the account which count Caunitz gave him of the sieur de Klingraaf's declaration, proceeds in this manner:

This minister added, that being immediately set out for Schoenbrunn, he had on the way ruminated on the answer which he should advise his sovereign to return M. de Klingraaf; and it appearing to him that the king of Prussia had two objects in view, which they wanted equally to avoid here, viz. to bring the affair to parleys and eclairsissements, which might at once occasion a suspension of the measures, the vigorous continuance of which was esteemed necessary; and in the second place, to urge matters farther, and bring other propositions and more essential engagements on the carpet, he conceived that the answer ought to be of such a nature, as should

* Vouchers, N^o. XXVIII.

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should elude entirely the king of Prussia's question, and while it left no room for any ulterior explanations, be at the same time both spirited and polite, without being susceptible of any interpretation, sinister or favourable; that, agreeably to this notion, it appeared to him sufficient that the empress should content herself with this simple answer: That, in the present great and general crisis of Europe, it was consistent with her duty, and the dignity of her crown, to take such measures, as were adequate to her own safety, as well as that of her friends and allies.

Hence it is plain, that count Caunitz, when he dictated this answer to his sovereign, proposed to himself to cut short to all manner of éclaircissements and ways of conciliation; and in the mean time to prosecute the preparations for the execution of his dangerous designs, in hopes that the king, his patience being exhausted, would take some step, of which he might avail himself, to make him be looked upon as the aggressor.

His majesty, without suffering himself to be discouraged by the bad success of his first step; and being unwilling to omit any thing that might tend to the preservation of peace, caused his instances to be still twice reiterated at the court of Vienna, desiring to have merely an assurance of not being attacked: but, on the second proposal that was made, the said court eluded this question, and contented itself with denying the existence of the combination against his majesty; which, however, has been just now proved; and, on the third requisition, an absolute refusal was made of any ulterior explanation of any sort.

From this constant refusal, of an assurance of so innocent a nature, the reality of the dangerous designs

designs of the court of Vienna receives its last degree of evidence; and it being no longer possible for his majesty to entertain the least doubt on that head, he saw himself obliged to have recourse to the only party which was remaining, to prevent those dangers with which he was threatened, by seeking an irreconcilable enemy that had vowed his destruction.

It is submitted to the decision of the impartial public, which of the two ought to be esteemed the aggressor; he who prepares all the methods in his power to crush his neighbour, or he who, seeing the arm already lifted over his head, endeavours to escape the fatal blow, by thrusting his sword in the breast of his enemy.

The conduct of the king towards the court of Saxony is founded on the same principle of an indispensable necessity, to provide for his own safety, against the most dangerous designs.

From the beginning of the present troubles, count Bruhl has assumed that part which had long been agreed upon between him and the allies of his court, by borrowing the mask of neutrality; but, till he could appear uncovered, he took special care to enter tooth and nail into the last combination that was formed against his majesty: a stronger proof of which cannot be given, than by repeating here the particulars above-mentioned; that this minister has not hesitated to co-operate in spreading the calumny of a revolt which the king intended to raise in the Ukrain.

The following passage will throw still a greater light on the system which count Bruhl proposed to himself the prosecution of, during the present war. Count Flemming having in one of his dispatches

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patches entered into a discussion of this question; which was more agreeable of the two to the interest of Saxony; that Silesia should remain in the hands of the king, or return to the court of Vienna? Count Bruhl made him this answer the 26th July 1756.

I have but one observation to make, relative to the doubt you seem to be in concerning this question, which redounds more to our advantage, that the king of Prussia should remain in the quiet possession of Silesia; or that it should return to the house of Austria, and we have no share in the acquisition? I agree, in the first place, that the successes which the court of Vienna may have, will not contribute to the making it more flexible towards us; but, however, we run not the same risks with that court that we, by sad experience, have been taught to apprehend from Prussia, and its great power; not only with respect to Poland, but Saxony likewise: nor do I, for my part, despair of our reaping some advantages from the favourable occurrences which shall perhaps offer themselves hereafter; and against which we don't omit to make sure, above all, of the friendship of Russia.

Count Bruhl lost no time in arranging his system of neutrality, in consequence of such principles.

This prime minister wrote to count Flemming, 1st July, of course two months before the king's army began its march,

That he was to propose to the court of Vienna the taking measures against the passage of a Prussian army through Saxony, by assembling an army in the circles of Bohemia, that border upon that electorate; and to give orders to
marshal

marshal Browne to keep up a secret understanding with marshal count Rutowski *.

To this count Flemming made answer, July 7, That count Caunitz had assured him the generals who were to command should be immediately nominated, after which one of them would be appointed to concert measures with count Rutowski: that the same minister had added, the court of Saxony was not to give any indication of perplexity or uneasiness, but, on the contrary, shew a resolute countenance; and at the same time *to prepare against all events, as he had the satisfaction to bear the king of Poland had already done, by giving orders in consequence to the aforesaid count Rutowski.*

A judgment may be formed of this concerting of measures, from the advice which count Flemming gives to count Bruhl in his dispatch, July 14.

To grant the passage to the Prussian troops, and afterwards take such measures as would be found most suitable.

From a dispatch of count Flemming, August 18, it appears, that the empress-queen had opened herself to this minister in the following words:

That she desired nothing of the king of Poland at this time, as she conceived extremely well the intricacy of his situation; that she hoped however he would in the interim put himself in a good posture, in order to be prepared against all events; and that her majesty, in process of time, in case matters between her and the king of Prussia did come to any eclat, should not be wanting, in case of need, in her concurrence with

* Vouchers, N^o. XXIX.

with the measures necessary for their mutual safety.

From a short review of all the facts which have been just exposed, there will result a faithful representation of the conduct of the court of Saxony towards the king; and a judgment may be formed of the justice of that which his majesty now observes with respect to that court.

The court of Dresden had a share in all the dangerous schemes that had been laid against the king; its ministers have been the authors and chief promoters thereof; and if that court has not acceded formerly to the treaty of Petersburgh, there was an agreement between it and its allies, by which it postponed its effectual concurrence, only till such time as the king's forces might be so weakened and divided, that pulling off the mask should be attended with no danger.

His Polish majesty had adopted as a principle, that every war between the king and one of his allies entitled him to make conquests on his majesty: the consequence was, that he fancied he might divide, in a time of full peace, the dominions of his neighbour.

The Saxon ministers have rung the alarm-bell against the king all over Europe, and they have not been sparing either in calumnies, in lyes, or in sinister insinuations, in order to increase the number of his enemies.

Count Bruhl has entered with eagerness into the last plot of Vienna, by the injurious report which he undertook to spread; and it has been shewn, that there existed already a secret combination between the courts of Vienna and Saxony, agreeable to which the latter was willing to let the king's army go through, and then to act suitably to the events; either by uniting with his enemies,

enemies, or by making a diversion in the territories that were unfurnished with soldiers. Such was the king's situation with respect to the court of Saxony, when he proposed to march into Bohemia, in order to prevent the danger which was prepared for him: his majesty could not therefore leave himself to the mercy of a court, of whose ill intentions he was apprized: but he saw himself forced to take such measures as prudence and the safety of his dominions required, and in which he was authorized by the conduct of the court of Saxony, with regard to himself.

End of the Memorial.



Original Papers, &c.

NUMBER I.

A Treaty of Eventual Partition,
of the 18th of *May* 1745.

IT having been but too well made known by experience to what lengths the King of Prussia carries his ill intentions, in order to disturb the repose of his neighbours ; and this prince having on the one hand repeatedly invaded, and laid waste the territories of her majesty the queen of Hungary and Bohemia ; and on the other, given uneasiness to his majesty the king of Poland, elector of Saxony, by several menaces, warlike preparations, and forced passages, without its having been possible to obtain from him, either the satisfaction due for the past, or a sufficient security for the future ; it has been considered, that this twofold end could not be

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procured so long as the said formidable neighbour was not confined within narrow bounds ; it is for this reason, that his majesty the king of Poland, elector of Saxony, as auxiliary ally ; and her majesty the queen of Hungary and Bohemia, as party attacked, and actually at war, are agreed, by the present separate and secret act, not only to employ their joint efforts, to the intire execution of the act passed between their majesties the 6-17th May 1744, and the measures concerted in consequence of the engagements contracted by their treaty of alliance concluded the 8th of January 1745, with the maritime powers ; but also, that they do not, either the one or the other, lay down their arms till, besides the conquest of all Silesia and the county of Glatz, the king of Prussia has been squeezed into still a narrower compass.

And, in order to prevent mistakes early, relative to the future conquests, in as much as by the eighth article of the said treaty of Warsaw, it is stipulated in general terms only, that his majesty the king of Poland, elector of Saxony, is to share in the advantages, by *being put in possession of certain districts which stand* convenient for him ; it has been judged necessary to point out the cases which might hereafter happen, and to be agreed in respect to each one of the same.

Sup-

Supposing therefore that, besides the re-acquisition of all Silesia, and the county of Glatz, the conquest might be compassed on the said king of the dutchy of Magedeburgh, the circle of Saal included, the principality of Crossen, together with the circle of Züllichau, namely, Cotbus, Peitz, Storkau, Beeskau, Somerfield, and other places, and districts which belong thereto; in this case all Silesia and the county of Glatz, Swibus only excepted, are to return to her majesty the queen of Hungary and Bohemia, who yields in exchange all the remaining part, just recited, with the district of Swibus, otherwise belonging to Silesia, to his majesty the king of Poland, elector of Saxony.

Supposing on the contrary, that besides the re-acquisition of all Silesia, and the county of Glatz, the conquests on the aggressor should be reduced only to the circle of Saal, the principality of Crossen, with the circle of Züllichau, and the abovementioned fiefs of Bohemia, thereunto belonging, in Lusatia; then and in that case, his Polish majesty, elector of Saxony, will content himself with this last share, and the district of Swibus, giving up in like manner unto her majesty the queen of Hungary and Bohemia, all Silesia, and the county of Glatz, Swibus only excepted: but supposing, last of all, that, contrary to all expectation,

tation, and notwithstanding the joint endeavours above-mentioned, it should not be possible to conquer, besides the county of Glatz, all Silesia, as likewise the principality of Croffen, with the circle of Züllichau, and the above said fiefs of Bohemia, possessed by the said king in Lusatia; in that case his Polish majesty shall have, besides the principality, the circle, and the fiefs which have been just mentioned, the district of Swibus, otherwise belonging to Silesia.

And, in order that his majesty the king of Poland, elector of Saxony, may be the more certain at least, and at the worst of these last acquisitions, her majesty the queen of Hungary and Bohemia promises, in the strongest and most solemn manner, that his majesty the king of Poland, elector of Saxony, shall have precisely the same securities for these new acquisitions, that she shall or will be able to procure for the re-acquisitions of her antient patrimonial territories; that is to say, Silesia and the county of Glatz; so that every thing here shall keep on equal pace, and that she will not have it in her power to avail herself of the possession of all Silesia, before his majesty the king of Poland shall be in like manner, in possession of his quota of the conquests.

To this end shall the Saxon troops of his Polish majesty remain in Silesia, when re-
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conquered, till his quota is made out to him, agreeably at least to the last of the cases above recited.

After which, the principal contracting parties shall guaranty to each other reciprocally for them and their heirs and successors for ever, whatever shall fall to each other's lot, using also their endeavours to procure likewise the guaranty thereof of their allies.

In witness whereof their majesties have signed with their respective hands a copy of the same tenor with this separate and secret act, that it may be exchanged the one with the other, and have caused their royal signets to be affixed thereto.

Done at Leipzig this 18th of May, 1745.

(L. S.)

AUGUSTUS, King.

Translation of the fourth separate
and secret article of the treaty of
Peterburgh, 22d of May, 1746.

HER majesty the empress queen of Hungary and Bohemia, declares, That she will observe religiously and *bona fide*, the treaty of peace concluded between her and his majesty the king of Prussia at Dresden, the 25th of December, 1745; and that she shall not be the first to go from the renunciation, which she has made, of her rights to the part which has been given up of the dutchy of Silesia, and county of Glatz.

But if, contrary to all expectation and the common desires, the king of Prussia should be the first to recede from this peace, by making any hostile attack, either on her majesty the empress queen of Hungary and Bohemia, or her heirs and successors, or her majesty the empress of Russia, or the republic of Poland; (in all which cases, the rights of her majesty the empress queen of Hungary and Bohemia to the part of Silesia and the county of Glatz that has been given up, and consequently likewise the guaranties which

which have been renewed in the 2d and 3d article on the part of her majesty the empress of Ruffia, would again take place and resume their first effect) the two high contracting parties are agreed expressly, that in this unexpected case, but not before, the said guaranty shall fully take place, and without loss of time; and promise solemnly that in order to avert the common danger of an hostile aggression of this kind, they will unite their counsels, and prescribe the same reciprocal confidence to all their ministers at foreign courts, that they may impart to each other in confidence whatever, on one side or the other, may come to their knowlege, relative to the designs of the enemy; and lastly, that her majesty the empress-queen of Hungary and Bohemia, will hold in Bohemia, Moravia, and the adjacent counties of Hungary, a body of troops in readiness, of 20,000 foot, and 10,000 horse; and that her majesty the empress of Ruffia will hold a like body in readiness in Livonia, Esthonia, and other neighbouring provinces; so as in case of an hostile attack on the part of Prussia, either on one party or the other, these 30,000 men may and ought to go to the assistance of the party attacked, in two, or at the latest, in three months, to reckon from the day of making the requisition.

But, as it is easy to foresee that 60,000 men will not be sufficient to avert such a blow, to recover the provinces yielded by the treaty of Dresden, and to secure at the same time for the future the general tranquillity, the two contracting parties have moreover engaged, to employ to this purpose, the case existing, not only 30,000 men, but even the double, that is 60,000 men on each side, and to assemble this body with as much celerity as the distance from the nearest provinces will admit of. The troops of her imperial majesty of all the Russias will be employed by sea or by land, as it shall be found most convenient, but those of the empress queen of Hungary and Bohemia shall be employed by land only; each party shall begin with making on the side of its own territories a diversion in those of the king of Prussia's, but afterwards they shall endeavour to unite and pursue the operations jointly; but before this junction be made, there shall be on the parts of both in the respective armies a general, as well to concert the operations as to be an eye-witness thereof, and in order by this channel to communicate to each other their respective advices.

Her majesty the empress of Russia, in promising such powerful assistance to her majesty the empress queen of Hungary and Bohemia,

Bohemia, has no design of making conquests on this occasion; but as she is pleased to make her body of 60,000 men act as well by land as sea, and that the equipping a fleet will be attended with considerable expences; so that, in thus dividing the force of the enemy, the Russian body may be justly considered as exceeding greatly the number of 60,000 men, her majesty the empress queen of Hungary and Bohemia, engages herself, and promises, That in order the more effectually to testify her acknowledgments, she will pay unto her majesty the empress of Russia, the sum of two millions of florins of the Rhine, in a year, reckoning from the day of her having Silesia in her power, without curtailing any part thereof, by virtue of what might have been drawn out of the enemy's country.

This fourth separate and secret article will have the same force as if inserted word for word in the body of the defensive treaty, and is to be ratified at the same time. In witness whereof the above-mentioned ministers have set their hands and seals thereto.

Done at St. Petersburg, May 22, 1746.

(L. S.)

Alexis Count Bestuchef Rumin.

(L. S.)

John Francis de Bretlack.

Nicholas Sebastian Noble de Hohenholtz.

Reso-

N^o III.

Resolutions and instructions for the
count de Vitzdom, and the sieur
de Pezold, at St. Petersburg.

A Circumstantial report being duly made to the king, of the contents of the last dispatches of the 18th, 19th, and 23d of April, of his privy counsellor and minister plenipotentiary at the imperial court of Russia, the count of Vitzdom, and his resident at the same court, the privy counsellor of embassy the sieur de Pezold, brought here from Petersburg by the courier Consoli, the 6th of December; and having taken into his special consideration the affair of accession, which the two imperial courts earnestly demand of him, to their new treaty of defensive alliance and its separate and secret articles, signed at Petersburg, the 22d of May, 1746, and afterwards ratified on both sides; his majesty has thought fit to cause his abovesaid two ministers to be provided on this head with the following heads of resolution and instruction, which are to serve them as a rule whereby they are to direct their negotiation and conduct in this affair, which is as nice as it is important.

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In as much as the high chancellor of Russia, has given them to understand, and likewise has cause it to be notified here by his brother the grand Marshal, that the two Imperial courts would be glad if the affair of the king's accession were treated and concluded preferably at Petersburg ; as being the place whereat the defensive treaty of alliance in question, renewed between them, has been negociated, concluded and signed ; his majesty does, in compliance, cause the count de Vitzdom, and the sieur de Pezold, to be provided to this purpose, with the power hereunto annexed, with the clause of *saint und fonders*, in order that, in case of absence, indisposition, or other hindrance of the one, the other may continue the negociation, communicating, however, with each other, and acting with a perfect concert.

II.

They are to enhance this readiness of the king's, with the high chancellor, and the ambassador Pretlack ; as being a certain proof of the prevalence of his majesty's sincere attachment to the two empresses, preferably to all other considerations, which might induce him to proceed more deliberately in an affair of this extent and consequence.

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III.

The resident Pezold, being the better acquainted with what passed, almost two years ago, between the two courts, when the king found himself in the case, and under the necessity of demanding the assistance of Russia, by virtue of their treaty of defensive alliance renewed against the king of Prussia ; and the said resident having been eye-witness of the indifference, slowness and insufficiency, with which an answer was made at the court of Peterburgh, to the repeated requisitions of his majesty ; a procedure to which Saxony ought chiefly to impute her extreme misfortunes ; he will do well to recall it to the memory of the high chancellor count Bestuchef in particular, not so much by way of making him any reproaches thereupon, but rather on the foot of reflections urged in confidence, and to make him agree to the generosity of the king's resolution, to yield so quickly to the desires of the two Imperial courts ; and that, after what has happened lately between him and the Russian court, nothing could have determined him so soon to this accession, but the great confidence which his majesty reposes in him the high chancellor, and his present credit and powers ; in hopes that this prime minister

minister will think of making amends for the past, by taking his measures so well before hand, as the king may hereafter, in case of need, have not only a timely and a sufficient assistance, but also that his majesty may, in cases of a reciprocal assistance, find his account, an indemnification, and a real advantage.

IV.

As to what relates to the principal treaty of the two Imperial courts, the king is thoroughly disposed to accede thereto, without any other restriction than that of the number of troops which they therein stipulate for themselves reciprocally, in the ordinary cases of lending assistance to each other; and it is necessary that his majesty's plenipotentiaries do propose and insist, to the end that his assistance be regulated in the act of accession on the footing of double the succour promised on the part of the electorate of Saxony; and the more so, as the court of Vienna sends to the king, and maintains at its own expence, in all cases, the reciprocal succours of 6 and 12000 men.

V.

When the count de Vitzdom and the sieur de Pezold, shall have joined issue with the ministers of the two contracting courts, they will likewise proceed to the king's accession

cession to the six separate articles, of which five are secret, and require much more reflection and settling, with regard to the king's conveniencies.

VI.

However, as his majesty, through inclination and zeal for the common interest and the public good, is not averse from uniting himself thereto, to the utmost, and in proportion to his strength ; his plenipotentiaries will take particular care to be more explicit on that head, with those of the two Imperial courts ; to the end that their demands, and the king's condescension to each article, be combined to the interest of his majesty.

VII.

There being among the articles, some engagements which properly relate only to the two Imperial courts principally contracting, they are to endeavour to obtain, that the king be dispensed with them, or that they may be temper'd in favour of his majesty ; as likewise that all future war in Italy be excepted, as it is already the case in the treaty with the court of Vienna.

VIII.

The first and fourth of the secret articles, being the most arduous and burthenfome, if the king accedes to them in their full sense and extent, the two Imperial courts can have no objection to his majesty's demanding, that be-

besides a juster proportion in the engagements, they may be made to contain reciprocal conditions and advantages.

IX.

As to the first secret article, which relates to the guaranty of the grand duke of Ruffia, his possessions as duke of Holstein-Sleswick, and his ducal house, the empress of Ruffia will be pleased to consider the great regard, which he must shew the court of Denmark, on account of his parentage and right of eventual succession; and therefore the said sovereign, as likewise the empress queen, and even the emperor her husband, will not refuse the king and his posterity, in exchange, the guaranty of the succession to the throne of Denmark; which in time ought to fall to a prince of the house of Saxony.

X.

Lastly, as to the fourth secret article, which relates to the eventual and stronger measures, against a new, sudden and unexpected attack from the king of Prussia, the king here acknowledges the wise forecast of the two empresses, in taking, at this distance of time, the proper measures, so as not to be at a loss to lend each other mutually, a powerful assistance, in case that, contrary to better hopes, and notwithstanding the most scrupulous attention on their parts to observe
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their treaties with the said princes, the latter undertook to invade the territories of either ; and the king is sufficiently inclined, in that case, to pursue the same measures ; but as he is most exposed to the resentment of so formidable and troublesome a neighbour, witness the sad experience which his majesty has had of it latterly, their Imperial majesties will not be surpris'd that the king, previous to entering into a new similar, eventual, and extensive engagement, should take his precautions better, as well for his security and mutual defence, as to be indemnified and recompenced on that account, proportionably to his efforts, and the progress which shall be made against such aggressor.

XI.

To this end the Count de Vitzdom, and the sieur de Pezold, are to desire to know from the Imperial plenipotentiaries, (1) What number of troops their sovereigns require on such an occasion from the king; and propose on each side to give him, by way of assistance, in exchange? And (2) They are to take care, that this succour required of the king, be not disproportioned to the strength of his army; (3) That the two Imperial courts do promise the king double. (4) That the two Empresses do engage to hold, each at least, such a body of troops in readiness to
march

march to the assistance of his majesty, on the one side towards the frontiers of Bohemia, and on the other, in Bohemia ; (5) That they oblige themselves to give the king a share in the prisoners, spoils, and conquests, which they shall make together, or separately, on the aggressor, and by that means, common enemy.

XII.

In regard to this last article, and partition of the future conquests, the king's ministers plenipotentiary, are to desire to know from the minister of Russia, what are the offers of his sovereign, and to declare relatively to the empress queen of Hungary and Bohemia, that at all events, and in case this princess, being a second time attacked by the king of Prussia, should succeed not only in reconquering Silesia, and the county of Glatz, but likewise in reducing this aggressor into narrower limits, the king of Poland, as elector of Saxony, would adhere to the partition stipulated between her and his majesty, by the convention signed at Leipfick, the 18th of *May* 1745, of which the Resident Pezold has received a copy by a ministerial letter of the 14th of November, of the same year ; except the third degree of partition therein defined, with which his majesty cannot possibly be satisfied ;

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because,

because, in case the empress-queen should succeed only in the conquest, besides the county of Glatz, of all Silesia, as likewise the principality of Crossen, with the circle of Züllichau, and the fiefs of Bohemia, possessed by the king of Prussia in Lusatia, a more considerable share in these conquests must be granted to the king elector of Saxony, than the said principality, the circle, and the fiefs ; relative to which, his majesty will wait the offers of the court of Vienna, where he will have it negotiated by the count de Lofs ; being desirous only that that of Russia would employ itself to obtain to this purpose from the empress-queen a better share for the king, and secure and guaranty afterwards the acquisition to the latter.

XIII.

For the above reasons the count de Vitzdom and the sieur de Pezold will receive every thing *ad referendum*, and will conclude nothing till authorized thereto by the king's orders, and final resolutions.

XIV.

The rest is left to their prudence, their dexterity and zeal for the service, the interests, and the glory of his majesty, who assures them of his protection and favour, in applying themselves to execute with all the
ex-

exactness they are capable of, the articles of this instruction.

Written at Dresden, May 23, 1747.

(L. S.) AUGUSTUS, King.

C. de Br. de Walther.

No. IV.

Translation of the memorial presented by the ministers of Saxony, at Petersburg, 14-25 Sept. 1747.

IN the conference which has been held with us, under-signed, the 8th and 9th inst. we have 'tis true, already exhibited our full powers, as well as the declarations of, and conditions on, which his majesty the king of Poland, our most gracious master, as elector of Saxony, is satisfied to accede to the treaty of defensive alliance concluded between the two imperial courts at Petersburg, the 22d of May, 1746, as well as to the secret and separate articles of the same treaty, agreeable to the orders and instructions which we have received on that head.

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But,

But, as their excellencies the ministers of the two imperial courts, authorised to confer with us, have desired to receive from us something in writing, we would not miss recapitulating what follows.

1. His Polish majesty acknowledges with equal gratitude and eagerness, the friendship which the two imperial courts have been please to give him a testimony of, in communicating to him the said treaty, with the separate and secret articles, and in desiring his accession thereto; but he at the same time flatters himself, that as he has so many important reasons to refrain in the present crisis from all new engagements, the two principal contracting parties will consider the facility which his majesty shews on this occasion, as a new instance of his sincere friendship, and his perfect confidence; and that they will be the more inclinable to regulate the said accession on such a footing, as that his majesty may not only be assisted without loss of time, and in a manner sufficient, the case happening, but likewise enjoy a proper indemnification, and real advantages, in consequence of his reciprocal and real concurrence.

2. With this confidence his majesty is ready to accede purely to the body of the treaty, with this one restriction only; that in return for the number of auxiliary troops which

which his majesty, as elector of Saxony, will oblige himself to furnish; the two imperial courts do stipulate the double for him, in imitation of the engagements already subsisting between him and her majesty the empress-queen of Hungary and Bohemia. As to what relates to the number of auxiliary troops to be furnished by our court, we are directed to wait the first overtures of the two principal contracting parties on that head. We are, however, of opinion from the succours which appear necessary to be furnished in the ordinary cases, upon which the body of the treaty turns, being already determined by the treaties which his majesty has actually with the two courts, the same might be adhered to in the present accession; and it may be sufficient to make this here one serve as a confirmation of the foregoing engagements.

3. The circumstances being very different with regard to the separate and secret articles, the first and fourth of which especially, deserve by much a more serious attention; we have received instructions relative to the first article, which relates to the guaranty of the present possessions of his imperial highness the grand duke of Russia, as duke of Holstein-Sleswick in Germany, to represent the great regard which his majesty is obliged to shew to the court of Denmark,

in consideration of the ties of blood, and the eventual succession which belongs to him, and to propose for this reason, that in return for the said guaranty which his majesty is to charge himself with, the guaranty of the two principal contracting powers, as well as the emperor's, be granted to him, with regard to the above-mentioned right of eventual succession to the throne of Denmark ; and that in the interim, this right may be acknowledged.

4. As to the fourth article his majesty approves of the wise and effectual measures which the imperial courts have entered on eventually, in case that his majesty the king of Prussia, notwithstanding the exact observation of the peace concluded with that prince, should attack a second time in an hostile manner the territories of either of the parties, and he is ready to concur therein. But as his majesty has still greater reasons than the two imperial courts to reflect maturely thereon ; and that he must above all consider, that, agreeable to the sad experience which he has had lately, the king of Prussia has taken a pretence from the succour which he was obliged to furnish her majesty the empress-queen of Hungary and Bohemia, for declaring him war ; that moreover the electorate of Saxony by its situation, is so much exposed to his resentment, that if it was not assisted

assisted immediately, it were not possible for it to guard itself by its own forces against the sudden attacks which we have seen the king of Prussia put in execution, and in short, if previous to every thing else, a provision be not made for the security and preservation of the said electorate, an infinite prejudice would result to the two principal contracting parties themselves, from the ruin of this state: in consequence of these considerations, his majesty flatters himself that the two principal contracting parties will themselves acknowledge the necessity and justice of the conditions and modifications which we are directed to propose, viz. 1. That the number of troops which shall be required from his majesty be not disproportioned to the strength of his army. 2. That each of the two imperial courts do promise the double to his majesty; and if that should not be sufficient, an assistance still greater. 3. That the two empresses do engage to hold each at least such a body of their troops alert, and in readiness to march to the assistance of his majesty on one side towards the frontiers of Prussia, and on the other in Bohemia. 4. That these bodies of troops do make a diversion in the countries that are most contiguous to them, from the very instant that the states of Saxony shall be attacked, and that without its being ne-

cessary to require a previous concert, notwithstanding what is stipulated to this purpose in the body of the treaty, as well as in the secret article. 5. That in case one of the two imperial courts be attacked, his majesty be not obliged to begin the operations, before the other imperial court has begun to act effectually, in order to avert the effect of the preponderating power of the enemy, or till at least the evident danger of being crushed all at once has vanished. 6. That his majesty be made to share, in consequence of article ten of the treaty, not only in the plunder, and the prisoners, but also the conquests which may be made on the enemy; and lastly, 7. That as her majesty the empress of Russia has declared in the fourth secret article, that in case of a succour to be lent, or a diversion to be made, she had no view of making conquests, and that consequently it will be indifferent to her in what manner his majesty shall settle matters with the court of Vienna, in regard to the eventual partition, and a proper indemnification, her imperial majesty of Russia be pleased to approve previously of this convention, and to take upon herself the guaranty thereof.

In regard, 5, to the second separate article, the third and fifth secret article, the accession of his majesty to these articles ought to
cease

cease of itself ; because on the one hand the said articles relate to engagements, in which the two imperial courts only are concerned ; and that on the other, by the non-communication to his majesty of the secret article of all, mentioned in the third secret article, they have themselves given to understand, that the king's concurrence to these engagements is not desired ; and that for the rest, they are willing to adhere to the stipulations made anteriorly in the treaties subsisting between his majesty and each of the two imperial courts. But in as much as in the third and fifth secret article the exception of the *casus fœderis*, already settled in the treaty itself, with regard to the future wars of Italy, has been still repeated, with this addition, viz. That on the part of the empress-queen, the present war with the house of Bourbon, and on the part of her majesty the empress of Russia, a hostile aggression on her empire towards the north are not to be deemed cases of such a nature as may hinder what has been stipulated in the fourth secret article, relative to a rupture on the part of Prussia ; so that the two high contracting parties will not refuse to comprehend likewise his majesty in this stipulation.

As for the rest, the king makes no doubt but the two imperial courts will find in this whole proposition, so many proofs of his equity,

equity, his confidence, and his sincere friendship ; and he flatters himself the more to receive a favourable answer, as the misfortunes which he has incurred for the common cause, have entitled him to a greater provision being hereafter made, both for his security, and to make him amends.

We the undersigned, expect the said declaration and answer, in order to be enabled to proceed farther in the affair of the accession.

St. Petersburg, 14-28 Sept. 1747.

Lewis Sigefroi Count Vitzthum d'Eckstadt.
John Sigismund de Pezold.

Nº V.

A dispatch of the king of Poland's
to count de Lofs, at Vienna, Dec.
21, 1747.

Monsieur count Lofs,

YOU will undoubtedly remember, that the two imperial courts of Vienna and Petersburg had no sooner invited me, by the counts Esterhazy and Bestuchef, to accede to the treaty of defensive alliance renewed between the two empresses the 22d of
of

of May, 1746, than I ordered that you might be fully informed of the instruction which was sent to this purpose to my plenipotentiary ministers at the court of Russia, where it was agreed, that the affair of my accession should be negotiated. You had notice of it by my directions the 23d of last May; and seeing that the court where you reside, delayed communicating to you the treaty in question, I gave orders that a copy thereof should be forwarded to you the month of July following; as also a copy of the secret and separate articles which had been communicated to me by the imperial ministers here, on the occasion of their common invitation. Mine at Petersburg having declared in general my favourable dispositions towards the accession, and produced their full power, have held themselves always in readiness to enter upon business with the ministers authorized for that purpose by the two empresses, without being able to attain their ends sooner than the 8-19th of September last, in a conference; and it having been required of them to deliver their overtures in writing, they have consented likewise to that in a pro-memoria, signed the 14-25th of September, of which I have caused a copy to be hereto annexed, under B.

As,

As, till such time as the two imperial courts return their answer thereto, by their ministers at Petersburgh, and before I take any final resolution on that head, relative to my act of accession ; it is a matter of import to me, to be agreed with the empress queen, concerning the eventual partition which I am to have for my portion, in case that princess attacked a second time, though we hope for the better, by the king of Prussia, do succeed with the concurrence of my assistance, in making spoils and conquests over him, in the same manner as that is explained in a greater detail in the 12th article of the above mentioned instruction, with which my ministers at Petersburgh were provided the 23d of May, &c. “ I charge you with
 “ this negotiation, and authorise you by the
 “ present order ; and my intention is, that
 “ as my convention, signed heretofore at
 “ Leipstick the 18th of May 1745, with the
 “ queen of Hungary, of which you will
 “ find a copy hereto annexed, under B.
 “ may serve for an eventual partition here-
 “ after, the third degree excepted, where
 “ in case the court of Vienna should not suc-
 “ ceed in re-conquering, besides the county
 “ of Glatz, only all Silesia with the princi-
 “ pality of Crossen, the circle of Züllichau,
 “ and the fiefs of Bohemia possessed by the
 “ king

“ king of Prussia in Lusatia.” I say my intention is, that you demand of the empress queen, a more considerable proportion for me in these conquests, than the principality, the circle, and the fiefs, and that you insist upon this princess’s making me an offer thereof, in order that I may afterwards be a judge, whether the acquiescing therein would suit my convenience. In making the overture of my demand, with respect to this affair, to the empress queen, and the minister, who has her confidence, you are to expose to them the justice and equity of granting me a portion, somewhat more advantageous, in order to indemnify and console me for my unfortunate lot, and the losses which have resulted to me, from having heretofore assisted her Imperial majesty with all my forces. My ulterior orders, which you shall receive, will be suited to the reports which you will make me successively, of the progress of your negotiation. In the mean time, I pray God that he, &c.

Written at Dresden, Dec. 21, 1747.

To the minister of conference and of
state, Count Loss.

AUGUSTUS, King.

C. de Bruhl.

No. VI.

Extract of the advice of the privy council of his Polish majesty, on the subject of the accession to the treaty of Petersburgh. Given 15 Aug. 1747.

WE are also of opinion, that the fourth secret article extends beyond the common rules, it being therein declared, that not only the case of a hostile aggression, on her majesty the empress queen, but also the case of the like aggression on the empire of Russia, or the republick of Poland, ought to be regarded as a violation of the peace of Dresden, and give a right to her majesty the empress queen, to claim the dutchy of Silesia, and the county of Glatz. Should your majesty, by your accession, countenance this stipulation, it would greatly increase the apprehensions we are under from the king of Prussia, and it would be allowing that principle which, on other occasions, we always impugned: that an auxiliary power ought to be considered on the same footing with the power at war.

Extract

No. VII

Extract of the advice of the privy
council of his Polish majesty, 17
Sept. 1748.

IT has been stipulated in the secret article,
that not only the case wherein the king
of Prussia, should attack her majesty the
empress queen ; but also every aggression on
the empire of Russia, or the republick of
Poland, shall be equally considered as an in-
fraction of the peace of Dresden.

Should then your majesty by your accessi-
on approve of a principle, so opposite to
the ordinary rules, and should the king of
Prussia come to the knowledge of it, he
might charge you with a breach of the peace
of Dresden.

No. VIII.

Extract of a postscript of the count
Bruhl's, to count Lofs at Paris.
Dresden, 12 June 1747.

AS to the two articles mentioned in your
excellency's letter of the 8th of Dec.
with respect to which you desire to have
the kings orders, I am to tell you, in his
ma-

majesty's name, that notwithstanding, to pretend to such a declaration be somewhat extraordinary, the king however gives your excellency leave to deliver a declaration, tending to assure, that in the treaty in question, nothing more is contained than what is the substance of the German copy ; which has been communicated ; and that we have no knowledge of any separate or secret article : but supposing also the existence of such an article, and that it was communicated to us with an invitation likewise of acceding thereto ; France may be assured that we shall enter into no engagements, that may tend to give her any offence, or be contrary in any shape to those which we have with that crown.

No. IX.

Count Lofs's declaration to the court
of France, 1747.

TH E undersigned ambassador extraordinary of his majesty the king of Poland, elector of Saxony, is authorised to declare, in the name of the king his master, that the treaty between the court of Vienna and that of Petersburgh, to which his majesty has been invited to accede, contains
nothing

nothing more than what appears in the German copy, which the abovementioned has had the honour to deliver to monsieur the marquis de Puyfieux ; and that no separate or secret article has been communicated to the king of Poland, on the behalf of the abovesaid courts. He is moreover ordered to add, that should this separate or secret article exist ; and his Polish majesty be invited to accede thereto, in that case his said majesty will contract no engagement, that may tend to give offence to the most christian king, or be ; in any ways, contrary to those subsisting between the king of Poland, and his most christian majesty, by the treaty which has been concluded between them, on the 21st April 1746. In witness whereof I have signed this declaration, and have set to it the seal of my arms. Done at the camp of the grand Commanderie, this &c.

Extract of the instruction of general Arnim, relative to his mission to Peterburgh. Dated 19th Feb. 1750.

B. **A**FTER this general d'Arnim, may insinuate that it might be remembered, in what manner his majesty had long since caused his ministers at Peterburgh, count Vitzdom, and the sieur de Pezold, to declare his inclination, to accede to the treaty of Peterburgh, of the 22d May 1746, and that it then was found the question *an?* was so closely connected with that of *quomodo?* that it was not possible to decide the one without the other.

C. That in the negociation, relative to the question *quomodo*; they met with all sorts of difficulties, as appears more amply from the Russian minister's memorial, dated the 3d of January 1748. in answer to the memorial of the king's ministers, 14-25 Sept. 1747. However, that his majesty flattered himself from the friendship of her majesty, the empress of Russia, and the good intentions of the Russian ministry, that nothing beyond his power would be required

required of him; and that his accession would not be otherwise desired, than on condition of his being charged with nothing that he was not capable of effectuating; that a promise should be made him, on the other hand, on the part of the two Imperial courts, in case his patrimonial territories in Germany be invaded in a hostile manner, of a quick, certain, and sufficient assistance, by means of two armies, which are always to hold themselves in readiness on the respective frontiers, in order to come immediately to his relief, or to make a diversion, according to the exigence of the case; and lastly, that it be positively determined what share he is to have in the advantages which may be gained, by a happy success of our arms.

No. XI.

Memorial delivered to the Russian minister, count Keyserling, at Dresden, 26 June 1751.

THE king has not hesitated to declare already, by word of mouth, to his excellency the count Keyserling, the good dispositions of his majesty, relatively to the definitive treaty of alliance, and guaranty

concluded at Petersburgh the 22d May 1746, between their Imperial majesties, the empress of Russia, and the empress-queen of Hungary, to which treaty the king has been invited to accede.

This declaration, together with all that has been given to understand, at the same time, to the said Russian minister, will be still fresh in his memory.

In the like manner, the same amicable declaration is here repeated, which among other salutary views, tends principally to prove the high esteem which his majesty entertains for their Imperial majesties, and the other allies, and the value which he sets on their friendship.

Nor does the king doubt in the least, from the assurances, so often given and repeated, of the precious friendship of her majesty the empress of Russia; but she will in return, in consequence of the accession in question, make previous and sufficient provision, for the security of the hereditary dominions of his majesty, and effectuate the same thing with the other allies.

He hopes that this will be the case, his majesty will cause his minister at the court of Russia, to be immediately provided with the instructions necessary to proceed farther in this business; and to bring the negotiation in question to an happy issue; of which

we

we would not but acquaint his excellency count Keyserling, that he may give notice thereof to his court, &c.

Dresden, June 26, 1751.

C. de Bruhl.

No. XII.

Extract of a letter from count Flemming to count Bruhl.

Vienna, February 28, 1753.

IN compliance with the dispatch with which your excellency honoured me the 19th instant, I expressed to monsieur count d'Uhlefeld the satisfaction of the king our master, relative to the clear and plain declaration of her majesty the empress-queen, in regard to the acknowledgement of the treaty which subsists between both courts, and the application of the case in question, with respect to the king of Prussia.

I added, at the same time, that it would be proper, and that the king my master expected it, that in imitation of Russia, the respective ministers who reside at the courts

principally interested in the preservation of the peace, were eventually authorised so as they may, when it is time, before which we ourselves would not desire it, declare in what manner the imperial courts would consider any act of oppression practised by the king of Prussia towards us.

Count Uhlefeld replied, That the orders to be sent for this purpose to their ministers, should admit of no difficulties, if we insisted on it; but that he did submit it again to my consideration, of what use could be to us, and what impression would make on the king of Prussia, such a declaration, which would be made agreeably to the sense of the treaty of 1743, considering the insufficiency of the succour therein stipulated: That he charged me to represent a second time to my court, that the ambitious views of the king of Prussia can never be sufficiently cautioned against; and that Saxony especially, as the most exposed, cannot use too much precaution to guard herself against him: That therefore it was of great importance to reinforce our antient engagements, on the footing proposed by the late count Harrach, in 1745. That this can be done on the occasion of our accession to the treaty of Petersburgh, or in whatever other manner which should seem to us more agreeable to our security, and most proper to keep it secret:

secret : That, in his opinion, there was no time to lose to put ourselves in a good posture and state of defence, the present conjunctures appearing to him to require absolutely, that the allied courts do enter into a closer union with one another than ever ; and that each of them do consider the interests of these terms, &c.

No. XIII.

Extract of a letter from count Bruhl
to count Flemming, at Vienna.

Dresden, March 8, 1753.

I Avail myself of the excursion of Sir Hanbury Williams, and this sure opportunity to communicate to you, sir, the report of the privy council of the 3d of this month, containing the sentiment of that council, with regard to the more extensive engagements to which we are solicited by the court of Vienna, on account of our approaching accession to the treaty of Russia. The communicating this to you is to be of no farther use to you than to inform you in what light the affair is considered here, and the difficulties which it meets with. But on the other hand, his majesty approves not of the expedient proposed, to insert first of all in

our act of accession the reciprocal engagement of mutually assisting each other with all our forces. His majesty is not, however, averse from being agreed hereafter in the most secret manner with the court of Vienna, with regard to such assistance, by means of particular declarations made in confidence relative to the fourth secret article of the treaty of Petersburg, by means of certain equitable conditions and advantages which in this case ought to be granted us, and in respect to which, you are to take *ad referendum*, all that they will be pleased to propose to you. In the mean time, I think, that what was promised to us by the declaration of the empress-queen, the 3d of May, 1745, may serve as a basis.

No. XIV.

Extract of a dispatch of count
Vitzdom's to count Bruhl.

St. Petersburg, April 18, 1747.

I Have the honour to acquaint your excellency, that Pretlack has told me in confidence, that in a secret interview which he has had with the empress and high chancellor,

chancellor, he had found means, by communications made in confidence on the part of his court, with regard to several intrigues of this prince, to the disadvantage of her imperial majesty, to inspire such sentiments as have worked up the enmity to the highest pitch; and in such a manner, as this ambassador imagines very little would be requisite to make her anger break out into action, &c.

I therefore opened with addressing myself to the ambassador Pretlach, after having made him a detail of all the advantages which might result, from our friendly steps, to his court, and even to that of Russia; in procuring the empress-queen, by an accommodation with France, a greater facility to make head against the king of Prussia, &c.

No XV.

Translation of the letter of the secretary to the embassy, de Weingarten, to count Uhlefeld.

Berlin, August 24, 1748.

A Courier from Lord Hyndford's, who came this way, the day before yesterday, brought me a dispatch from count Bernes,

Bernes, which gives the count Keyserling and myself, great lights, in regard to the military preparations of this place. In as much as count Bernes writes word, that the French and Prussian party in Sweden laboured hard to procure the prince successor the sovereignty; that in consideration of these circumstances, it were to be wished the empress's voyage to Moscow might be prevented; and as nobody had it more in his power to contribute thereto, than count Keyserling, on account of the preparations and dangerous designs of the court of Berlin, this minister should be stirred up to that purpose. As the man is already sufficiently prejudiced against this court, I had no great difficulty in obtaining my end, having shewn me yesterday his relation cooked up to the taste of the count Bernes with a promise of a continuance, weekly, on the same strain.

No XVI.

Letter from count Bernes to count Puebla, dated from Petersburg, Dec. 12, 1749,

I May venture to make you the following requisition in the greatest secrecy. It is desired you would insinuate into the ear of M. Gros, the

the Russian minister, but with so much precaution, that it may never be suspected it came from you, that there are things brewing in Sweden against the person of the empress, in which the court of Prussia has no small share ; and as the said minister will not probably fail entrusting you with this discovery, you are desired to make answer, That as you know nothing of the matter, you will make enquiries about it, and afterwards to confirm it to him as a thing you had found to be true upon enquiry.

No XVII.

Extract of the instruction given to
general d'Arnim.

Dresden, Feb. 19, 1750. Translated.

General d'Arnim will be careful to keep up the diffidence of the empress, and her good intentioned ministers, against the Prussian power, its aggrandisement, and the ill use that is made of it ; and consequently he must not fail to extol and give his applause to the attention of the empress, and the measures which she might take to oppose it, &c.

Extract

Extract of a letter from the sieur de Funck to count Bruhl, dated at St. Petersburg, Dec. 6, 1753, translated.

IN giving an account of the motives which he (Funck) and baron Bretlach, minister of Vienna, had alledged to the Russian ministers for keeping constantly a strong army on the frontiers of Prussia, he says, he has, among other things, represented to them,

That this caution was by so much the more necessary, as, considering the known views of the courts of France, Prussia, and Sweden, in case of the throne of Poland becoming vacant, the king of Prussia would not then further delay the execution of his designs on Polish Prussia, and the mouth of the Vistula.

That copy should be taken after the king of Prussia, who regretted not the expence, when it tended to render him formidable, as appears from his having just now formed three more regiments; that the court of Russia ought not to apprehend her being deserted by her allies, when they should come to blows; that they were too well acquainted with their own interests, &c.

Extract

No. XIX.

Extract of the dispatch of count Bruhl to the sieur Funck, at Petersburgh, Feb. 6, 1754, translated.

I Make no doubt of the court of Russia being already apprized of the different motions and arrangements which the king of Prussia causes to be made in the kingdom of that name, with the greatest celerity, and in the most secret manner, in regard to the commerce and finances, and especially the military preparations; I am in hopes likewise, this court will be the more attentive to all this, as these preparations have been observed to take place after the great augmentations which the empress of Russia had made latterly in the neighbouring provinces, and appear to have some relation thereto; I have thought it my duty, however, to communicate to you the advices which we have received successively of this, that they may be of use to you in your conferences with the ministry of the court you are at. For our parts, we are all attention on this occasion, and the more so, as we know how desirous the king of Prussia is to interfere with the do-

domestic affairs of Poland; that his projects to destroy the commerce of Poland, and above all, that of Dantzick become daily more conspicuous, and that his views of aggrandisement on that side, are most certainly one of the most flattering objects of his ambition.

Count Bruhl's dispatch of the 15th of February, 1754, turns upon nothing but the military preparations which the king was making in Prussia.

No. XX.

Extract of the sieur Funck's letter to
Count Bruhl, June 31, 1754.

ACcording to the report of the envoy de Gros, your excellency has informed him yourself of the approaching levy of seven new Prussian regiments. Thanks are returned to your excellency for this advice, and assurances given you that it shall not fail to be turned to good account, as it will be likewise with all other news of the same nature.

Extract

Extract of count Bruhl's dispatch to
the sieur de Funck, from Warsaw,
July 28, 1754, translated.

THE designs which are hatching by
some ill-intentioned powers against
Courland, may be known among several
other tokens and preparatives, from the pub-
lick Gazettes of Berlin. Here we are told
sometimes of the death, sometimes of the
desperate state of health of the unfortunate
duke, in order thus to prepare the public for
the events which are to follow.

Extract of count Bruhl's dispatch to
the sieur Funck, from Warsaw,
August 2, 1754, translated.

IN speaking of the umbrage which the
Ottoman Port was taking, on account of
the fortress building by the court of Russia,
on the frontiers of Turkey: he adds, The
courts of France and Prussia have hitherto
laboured constantly to draw the Ottoman
Port

Port into a war with Russia; this affair would afford them a fine opportunity; the king of Prussia would delay no longer pulling off the mask, and declaring openly the object of his continual armaments; in which case Courland might possibly become the first sacrifice to his ambition.

No. XXIII.

Extract of a dispatch of count Bruhl to the sieur Funck, Dec. 1, 1754, translated.

I Cannot conceal from you the advice which I have received concerning the new design of the king of Prussia, in order to facilitate his views of aggrandizement. 'Tis well known, that this prince labours this great while past, to draw the courts of Sweden and Denmark into his interests; the attempt which he has made to that purpose in Denmark, on the occasion of the prolongation of the treaty of subsidy between that court, and that of France, not having succeeded, he applies himself to other methods to gain over the court of Denmark.

The birth of the young grand duke of Russia must have appeared to him a favourable

able circumstance to the attaining his ends ; for as he fancies, that after this event, which settles the succession in the dutchy of Holstein, the negotiation relative to the exchange of that dutchy against the county of Oldenberg, will be attended with greater difficulties ; and that the court of Denmark will be sorry to renounce an arrondissement so much wished for ; 'tis pretended, that in order to succeed in his views, he has caused another plan to be proposed to the court of Denmark. It has not been hitherto possible to search this plan to the bottom, in order to know what it consists in ; in what manner he has promised to second it ; if he aims even at violent means, and what he proposes to stipulate for himself in return. However, my advices give me room to conjecture, that in this project the pretence of the Greek religion, which the grand duke has embraced, has not been forgot, it not being one of those that are tolerated in the empire, and that hopes are by these means conceived to succeed in making the empire, and the guarantees of the peace of Westphalia, parties in this affair.

Though I do not pretend to determine any thing relative to this project, otherwise so much of a piece with the genius of the king of Prussia ; and that I am also of opinion, the court of Denmark will not be the

dupe thereof, yet the very idea of such a project seems alone to be an affair of sufficient importance to require your giving notice of it in confidence to the Russian ministry; but still with the proper caution, &c.

N^o. XXIV.

Extract of a letter from the sieur Funck to count Bruhl, translated.

Petersburgh, June 9, 1755.

IT would be serving the common cause, were it suggested in confidence to m. de Gros, that he make mention in one of his reports, in general terms, so as only to have occasion to insinuate it artfully to the empress, that the king of Prussia must have found a channel in Courland, whereby he is informed exactly of the secrets of this court, &c.

N^o. XXV.

Extract of count Bruhl's dispatch, to mr. Funck, July 23, 1755, translated.

WHILE I acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 30th ultimo, I am to tell you that I have not failed to
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acquit myself towards monsieur de Gross, of the commission contained in your letter of the 9th ultimo; he has received with thanks the advice which has been given him, that he could not more effectually make his court, than by making often, and skilfully, mention in his reports of the pernicious views, and the artifices of the court of Prussia, which have but too much truth in them; and he will not fail to make good use of this advice, &c.

N^o. XXVI.

Extract of the sieur Funck's letter to count Bruhl, from St. Peterburgh, Oct. 20, 1755.

ALL I can say positively, concerning the deliberations of the last great council, consists in this: that laying for a foundation the known result of the grand council of Mosco, it has been settled a second time, as a fundamental maxim for the future, to oppose with all their might the ulterior aggrandisement of the house of Brandenburg; and to put themselves, for that purpose, in such a condition as to be able to lay hold of the first opportunity,

that shall offer; and a resolution is taken to attack the king of Prussia, without any ulterior discussion; not only in case this prince should attack one of the allies of this here court; but also this attack is to take likewise place, if the king of Prussia should happen to be hemmed in by any of the allies of this court. 'Tis proposed for this purpose to establish magazines for an hundred thousand men at Riga, Mitau, Libau, and Windau; and a fund has been found to answer the expence of these arrangements, of two millions and a half of rubles, and another annual fund of a million and a half.

N^o XXVII.

Extract of count Bruhl's dispatch to
secretary Prasle, at Petersburg,
June 2, 1756.

AS to what relates to the secret commission, to cause the advices of the Prussian machinations in the Ukrain, to be conveyed through invisible channels to Petersburg, we are still employed in looking out for a good and sure channel; and the effect of my inclination to second so good an intention, though favouring somewhat of artifice, will be perceived, in one shape or another very soon.

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Extract of a letter from count Fleming to count Bruhl, from Vienna, June 1756.

I Must still add, that by the last rescript count Keyserling has been directed to regard neither trouble nor money, to come at the exact knowledge of the state of this court's revenues. 'Tis likely the reason, for endeavouring to come at this knowledge is, to know accurately, whether they are here in a condition to support by their own forces, and without the assistance of England, the expence of a war, and whether they can moreover pay subsidies, &c.

From the same, dated June 9.

THERE is room for presuming, that it has been a matter concerted, between the two imperial courts of Vienna and Russia; that the latter, the better to conceal the motives of its armaments, do alledge the specious pretence: that it may have it in its power, by that means to fulfill its engagements, contracted by the last subsidiary convention with England, in case it were found necessary;

fary ; and when all the preparations have been finished to fall on the king of Prussia unexpectedly.

From the same, June 19.

FROM the general and enigmatical overtures, made by a certain minister to the sieur Prasse, concerning the armament of Russia, and which your excellency has been pleased to communicate to me by the said dispatch ; I have observed that this minister begins to grow more reserved and mysterious, relative to the intentions of his court. This circumspection appears to me to coincide with that observed here, where they content themselves in the same manner, with giving to understand that they have no other design than remaining quiet, and preparing themselves against all events that may arise from the present conjuncture, &c.

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N^o. XXVIII.

Letter from count Fleming, to count
Bruhl.

Vienna, June 28, 1756.

My Lord,

M De Klingraaf received last Saturday an express from his court, in consequence of which he sent the next day a card to count Caunitz, earnestly desiring that he would appoint an hour when he could speak to him. This card was delivered to the chancellor of state, precisely at the time that he was in conference with the marshals Nieperg and Brown, and with general prince Piccolomini; and as his intent was to repair immediately after the conference to the empress-queen, in order to make her a report thereof, he ordered an answer to be returned to m. de Klingraaf; that he was under a necessity, 'tis true, to go to Schoenbrunn; but that he would however take it as a favour, if he would hasten to come at that very instant; which the Prussian minister did not fail to do. Count Caunitz told me in confidence, in a conversation which I had with him yesterday

morning, that m. de Klingraaf, upon his first coming into his apartment, had given sufficient indication, by means of a certain disturbance blended with uneasiness, which discovered itself on his Countenance, that he had just received an express from his court; who, he declared, had brought him such orders, as he must expose the contents thereof in person to the empress-queen; and that, for that purpose, he was directed to demand a private audience of her majesty, which he desired count Caunitz would be pleased to procure him: That he, count Caunitz had replied, that as he was just going to Schoenbrunn, he undertook with pleasure to demand the audience for him which he desired; but that he could not help acquainting him that it was proper he should be enabled to prevent, at least in general terms, the empress with respect to the insinuations which he was directed to make her majesty: that upon this m. de Klingraaf had told him, that he was charged to ask amicably, and by way of eclaircissement, in the name of his master, what the end was of the armaments and warlike preparations making here; and if by chance he was meant thereby: which however he could not persuade himself of; as he was not conscious of having given the least
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occasion thereto ; that he, Caunitz, had replied that he could make no previous answer concerning this overture ; that he would not fail making a report thereof to the empress, and procure him the audience he desired ; however, he could not help expressing to him his surprize at the explanation which the king his master required, concerning the measures which were taking in this country ; whereas on this side no instance of any uneasiness or umbrage was given to this prince, on account of the great motions and preparations, which were first of all observed in his army. This minister has moreover told me, that having set out immediately after this for Schoenbrunn, he had reflected, as he was going along, on the answer which he should advise his sovereign to give m. de Klingraaf, and that upon imagining that the king of Prussia had a double object in view, which they wanted equally to avoid here, viz. to bring the business to parleys and eclaircissements, which at once would occasion a suspension of the measures, the vigorous continuance of which was esteemed necessary ; and in the second place, carry things still farther, and bring other propositions, and more essential engagements on the carpet ; he had judged that the answer ought to be of such a nature, as might elude intirely the question of the king of Prussia, and leaving no farther room for
 ulterior

ulterior explanations, be equally resolute and polite, without being susceptible of any sinister or favourable interpretation. That, conformably to this notion, it appeared to him sufficient, the empress should content herself with this simple answer; that in the present great and general crisis in which Europe was, it was equally consistent with her duty, and the dignity of her crown, to take such measures as were sufficient for her own security, as well as that of her friends and allies: that the empress-queen had approved of this answer; and as a proof that the step and the demand of the king of Prussia had occasioned no perplexity here, her majesty had caused the hour for m. Klingraaf's audience to be appointed for next day, which was the day before yesterday; and that after she had heard out the proposition of this minister, just as he had exposed it the day before to count Caunitz, she answered him precisely in the same terms that have been mentioned; and by a motion of her head put at once an end to the audience, without entering into any further particulars. 'Tis true, all Vienna then assembled in the empress-queen's antichamber, on account of its being a day of Gala, saw m. de Klingraaf go in, and immediately after beheld him come out with an air pretty much stunned. I have received all these circumstances from

from m. Caunitz's own mouth, who has on this occasion spoke to me with more openness and confidence than he has done till this time ; nay, he has charged me to mention them in my dispatches to your excellency, reserving however to himself the most exact secrecy on that head.

That this answer, as full of energy as it is obscure, will throw the king of Prussia into great perplexity, is not at all doubted ; and 'tis pretended here, that this prince must be under great uneasiness, and that he has already drawn out of his treasure near three millions, which his preparations and augmentations have stood him in.

'Tis presumed that the end which he proposed to himself, by asking the above-mentioned question, was probably this ; that if it should be answered it was himself had occasioned the armaments that were making, he would have endeavoured to disculpate himself, by giving it as a proof of the contrary that for this very reason he had not even assembled the troops for the camps, which he had already directed to be marked out, in order to exercise his soldiers ; but on the contrary had ordered the regiments to separate ; in hopes possibly to lay this court under the necessity of following his example, and putting in like manner an end to its preparations ; I am however of opinion that
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he had found it a difficult task by these kind of illusions, to divert it from its designs.

Advice is come by an express dispatched by count Puebla, arrived here last Sunday, that notwithstanding the feigned dispositions of the king of Prussia, his troops continued filing towards Silesia. They are besides, extremely sensible that this prince, by the local position of his army, which he can assemble in as many weeks as they must here employ months, on account of the distance of the places where the troops are quartered, has too palpable an advantage over this court here; which by long and continual marches, he might throw into such expences, as might at last grow insupportable; I say they are very sensible how necessary it is to pursue the measures already begun, so as to be in the present circumstances an equal match, and in a good posture, by which means the king of Prussia may be obliged, in order to support his armaments, and the augmentations which have already taken, or are to take place, and which exceed his means, either to dwindle away by little and little, or to prevent this inconvenience, suffer himself to be hurried into some precipitate resolution, which is precisely what they seem to me to wish for.

The return of M. de Klingraaf's courier, which the said prince must undoubtedly expect

pect with the greatest impatience, will enable us to see farther into his dispositions. 'Tis to be believed, that if he thinks himself threatened, he will delay no longer striking some blows, and preventing those whom he stands in fear of, in order to avail himself of the situation in which they shall be here, till the latter End of August, which is the time fixed for the total assembly of the troops. But on the other hand, if he remains quiet, he may be persuaded, that he will be neither disturbed or attacked, *at least this year*. However, from what Remarks I can make, I cannot help thinking, but that this court must be very certain of the friendship and attachment of Russia. This notion seems to me to be still confirmed, by a letter which the Dutch Minister at Petersburgh, M. Swart, has written, the 6th of this month, to M. de Burmannia, where, among other things, he mentions, that the French emissary, the chevalier Douglas, gained ground daily.

As this cannot but produce in Russia an alteration of its antient system, it does not at all appear wonderful, that the high chancellor count Bestuchef, agreeable to what your excellency has done me the honour to write me word in your last dispatch, should have resolved on retiring into the country, on pretence of the recovery of his health,
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and to withdraw from business, till such time as he should see what turn affairs would take, and from a fore-knowledge, perhaps, that this moment is not very distant : in as much as all seems to depend on the king of Prussia's resolutions ; it being undoubtedly true, that if he remains quiet, neither will the court of Vienna begin to do any thing, *at least this year* ; but they will endeavour to complete, during this interval, their preparations, so as to be next year in a situation to take such a resolution as will be agreeable to the circumstances, events, and times.

And this is a further confirmation to me of the opinion which I took the liberty of communicating to your excellency in my foregoing letters, that our court has not a more certain method of availing itself of the present conjuncture of affairs, which was never perhaps so favourable during the reign of our august master, than to put itself in a good posture, so as to be courted. One of my friends, who pretends to have his information from one of the clerks of the treasury, assures me, that this court has had a million of florins transmitted to Russia.

Count Caunitz has told me, that the advices which your excellency had conveyed him, relative to the rumours spread by the king of Prussia, with regard to certain alliances

ances to be entered upon between him and us, as also with Ruffia ; and moreover, that the court here was interfering in a mediation between France and England, he had already received from elsewhere ; and consequently, that they deserved so much the greater attention, and required to be contradicted, of which care should be taken, by sending orders for that purpose to the ministers of the empress-queen at the courts of Europe. I have been likewise told by this chancellor of state, that there were advices, as if the king of Prussia had a notion of surprizing the town of Stralsund, in Swedish Pomerania ; and that in all likelihood, should this prove true, it must have been in consequence of the plot lately discovered at Stockholm.

Should your excellency have an opportunity of making any insinuations with safety to the court of London, it were perhaps doing it a piece of service to give it intimations of its dangerous situation, into which it has been betrayed by the bad councils of those who enjoy at present the greatest degree of credit there.

This court will find it a difficult task to get out of the perplexed situation into which it has precipitated itself ; and if it does not renounce the alliance of the king of Prussia,
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and make its peace with France, upon the best terms possible, this last will proceed from success to success, and from project to project, which at long run, may end in the ruin of the house of Hanover.

I must desire it as a favour of your excellency, that you will say nothing particular to m. de Broglie, relative to what I have the honour to mention to your excellency; that ambassador corresponds with M. d'Aubéerre, who has told me, with some surprize; count Broglie was thoroughly persuaded that here they were hatching something against the king of Prussia; and that he went even so far as to accuse him of diffidence, and too much reserve, relative to the designs of the court of Vienna.

The marquis d'Aubéerre having for a long time solicited leave to absent himself during some months from his post in order to attend some family-affairs, has just obtained that favour.

General Karoli, and not general Nadaſti, as it had been believed, is just declared Banus of Croatia.

I have the honour to be with the most profound respect,

My Lord,
Your Excellency's
C. FLEMMING.

To

Dresden, July 1, 1756.

To count Flemming, at Vienna.

S I R,

I Take the opportunity of a courier, whom count Strenberg dispatches to his court, with the advices which count Puebla has lately communicated to him, relative to the grand military preparations of the king of Prussia, which appear more and more to threaten a commencement of hostilities on his part.

Your excellency will not miss being more particularly informed of these advices and dangerous appearances, from their imperial majesties ministry ; and therefore I content myself with conveying to you, hereto annexed, the extract of M. de Bulow's last letter, which discovers the same apprehensions. Having just now discoursed, in confidence with count Sternberg, on that subject ; I am to authorise you, sir, to confer relative to an object of such importance to both courts, with the ministry of that where you reside. You are to make them sensible of the difficult

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and dangerous position which we might be exposed to from the passage of a Prussian army through Saxony, to which our situation by no means allows us to make any opposition ; or perhaps from some proposal or ulterior demand of a more signifying nature, which his Prussian majesty might make us on this occasion. And to prevail on them to open themselves in the utmost confidence to you, concerning the measures which they propose making use of, in order to guard themselves against an unjust attack ; and at the same time to cover, and protect the king our master's territories, which become once more threatened, on account of our faithful attachment to our allies.

To answer this last purpose, it were undoubtedly necessary to assemble immediately a sufficient body of troops in the circles of Bohemia, the most contiguous to our frontiers ; and it would promote the service of both courts equally, if her majesty the empress-queen were pleased to give directions to field marshal Brown, that he would communicate and concert measures, at all events, and with the proper caution and secrecy, with our field marshal count Rutowski, who is already authorized for that purpose by the king.

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From the persuasion I am in that the court of Vienna finds her own account in our preservation, I have been more explicit on this whole subject with count Sternberg, who will not fail making a circumstantial report thereof by the same courier ; and as for the rest, I may trust to your understanding, Sir, your zeal and your skill, which will render unnecessary any addition to this letter, relative to all the reflections and essential motives suitable to this critical situation, and agreeable to the connections that subsist between both the courts.

I must only earnestly request your excellency to hasten as much as possible the eclairsissements which you may have to send me, being very truly, and with, &c.

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